Part I

What is Semantics A Theory *of*, and How Do I Know There Are Such Things?

Neurath has likened philosophy to the plank-by-plank repair of a ship at sea. And Wittgenstein spoke of the ladder to be thrown away once climbed. Both metaphors acknowledge the bootstraps nature of philosophic ascent but leave obscure how this improbable lift can be accomplished. Perhaps a better comparison would be to a mountaineer working his way up a sheer rock chimney. Considerable focused exertion is required just to preserve the heights already attained, which can be precipitously lost by a burst of careless enthusiasm; but most essential is to search out those features of the rock face against which one's effort can be vectored into some component of upward thrust, and to distribute across these only such weight as their respective strengths can bear. The figure is imperfect—the climber's slow, tightly confined tension reflects only poorly the exuberant revolutions which so often carry philosophy through great arcs in which horizontal sweep is mistaken for elevation. Even so, it aptly models how philosophy can best be assayed. For philosophy's main problems and data stay pretty much the same from one generation to the next, and all but its most difficult slopes have already been often scaled, no matter how fresh they may look to the latest youthful expedition. Though such reascensions remain essential as training exercises, the main challenge worthy of the serious professional lies in the unsurmounted, seemingly impossible crags scarcely visible from the easy slopes. To progress even minutely in these advanced ascents, however, requires an exquisite awareness of the climbing surface's texture and the most delicate balancing of forces against it.

In various past commentaries on philosophical semantics I have assumed assumptions and concluded conclusions which differ but modestly (though perhaps not altogether trivially) from views on such matters favored by many writers before me—and rejected, all or in part, by numerous others. To expect that resumption of these or related disputes in any of the familiar styles can markedly alter the balance of this disagreement would be ingenuous at best. But can there, then, be any epistemic substance in philosophical semantics? Must it come to nothing but a zero-sum game which can give delight through the artistry by which some contestant scores a transient point but whose allowable positions are all known in advance? Despair is understandable, but I hope still premature. Just possibly, were we to stand back from the hard press on particular issues and survey the topology of the climbing faces, we might discern an essential structure of attack. Perhaps, just perhaps, the main sequence of rises and handholds which must be traversed to achieve significant ascension can be charted even if it is still unclear how all these passages can be accomplished. At the very least this would provide the sense of direction which semantical theory now seems to lack, and with a little luck might even establish a permanent base camp more advanced than any now available.

In any event, that is the hope which motivates this essay. What follows is the first installment of what aspires to become a comprehensive study of philosophical semantics' method-

ological foundations—why we have semantical concepts at all, by what transcendent logic we can seemingly stand apart from our own conceptual system and study its relation to extralinguistic reality, and, most crucially, how we might establish semantical principles which are neither tautologically trivial at one epistemic extreme nor arbitrarily speculative at the other. Few if any startlingly new details will be forthcoming, for the ground to be covered is already much trampled in all directions. What I seek is not specificities hitherto overlooked, but a perspective on the whole which bares its epistemic structure.

I

Let me then begin. But how can I, when the matter's beginning is irretrievably lost in our ancestral preverbal past? *I cannot even say what the issues are without presupposing by the very form or phrasing of my utterance much of what needs to be questioned.* To be sure, all voyages of Neurath's ships have this problem, but the craft of semantics is especially vulnerable in this regard, and brave talk about open-sea repairs does little to help engineer the job. Even so, we can retain buoyancy during even the most basic foundational repairs by carefully heeding two precautions. One is to shun narrowly precise uses of problematic concepts at the outset of inquiry in order that these initial moves may remain compatible with, yet not inflexibly predetermine, whatever technical explications eventually prove most apt for those concepts. The other is to seek outset formulations which have utmost pragmatic indispensability. For if arguments cannot move toward conclusions except from premises, then on pain of existential inauthenticity let conclusions I intend to live by be grounded so far as possible only on cognitive commitments without which I should be incapable of survival in whatever life-space is most real to me. The methodology to which I allude should become clearer as I try to practice it. It is, however, very much opposed to hypothetico-deductive philosophising which casts around for premises that will sustain some prejudged ideal consequent. However instructively such argument may reveal possibilities and clarify relationships, it does little to enhance the credibility or refine the accuracy of its target conclusion.

I start, then, not at the beginning but wherever I can catch hold. One good entry is to illustrate the epistemic futility of enjoining semantic controversy without the most careful preparation. Consider the correspondence principle of Truth as conveyed by the schema

(1) '*p*' is true iff (if and only if) *p*.

Eventually, I shall want to argue not merely that any sentence is true which is derived from (1) by substituting a meaningful declarative sentence for both occurrences of letter '*p*' therein, but that analysis of the interplay between use and mention in (1) greatly illuminates the basic character of semantical theory. But are the concepts "Truth", "meaning", or even "sentence" so technically secure that a critique of semantical foundations can afford to exploit them before they have been troubleshot? To do so only insures that subsequent conclusions about whatever may underlie these semantical terms will not be hard-won gains (and any genuine gain in these matters will perforce be hard-won) but elaborate beggings of the question. For that matter, is (1) even the most suitable wording for the correspondence principle of Truth? It is, after all, only one of nine variants in array

	'*p*' is true		'*p*'
(2)	It is true that *p*	iff	it is the case that *p*.
	That-*p* is true		it is a fact that *p*.

Under appropriate substitutions for '*p*', are these all merely paraphrases for one another, or do some diverge significantly from the others? Regardless of paraphrastic equivalence, are they all logically well-formed and meaningful (e.g., if the three clauses on the left of (2) differ by more than prosodic style, does the grammar of 'is true' equally tolerate these different contexts?), and are the well-formed ones then also all true? At the very least, alternatives (2) differ *prima facie* importantly enough that to select one over another without thoughtful argument is manifestly jeopardous.

For that matter, have we any real use for the label 'true' at all, except as a counter in philosophers' games? For whatever may be the correspondence principle's optimal formulation, does it not show how truth-ascriptions can be paraphrased into statements in which semantical concepts do not appear? Just where would it pinch were we to enforce an oath of abstention from 'true' and its cognates? Consider a few commonsensical usages:

(*i*) When I tell you that I caught three 20 lb. pike on my fishing trip last weekend, you act politely indifferent. 'But it's true', I insist, 'I really did!'.

Little seems gained here by my use of 'true' that repeating my original assertion with increased emphasis on cues tokening my sincerity would not achieve equally well. The function of 'true' in cases like this is of a kind with shouting and pounding on the table, as opposed, say, to speaking with a sly smile. It provides little nourishment for semantics as a discipline with its own subject matter.

(ii) The charge before the court is that the defendant, Richard Roe, did on a certain specified occasion commit certain acts of intrusion upon the person of the plaintiff, Mary Doe. Miss Doe testifies that the charge is true. Mr. Roe insists that the charge as stated is false (or, not quite equivalently, that it is not true), since he did nothing that was not invited by the plaintiff.

If the charge, '*p*', in this case is a long, complicated statement, it is clearly much easier to assert or deny 'The charge is true' than it is to assert or deny '*p*'. Apart from this convenience, however, Miss Doe's purpose could be served just as well by asserting the charge itself as by affirming its truth. Similarly, there seems little for Roe to choose between denying that *p*, or asserting that not-p, on the one hand, and avowing that the charge is false on the other. Even so, when Roe insists that the charge as stated is false, and proceeds to detail respects in which he deems it defective, it is not completely obvious that merely asserting his own version of the events in dispute will accomplish the same result. I shall not elaborate on this point, since the style of Roe's rebuttal might be schematized as

An essential component of the charge is that *q* (or, '*q*'), isn't it? Well, not-*q* and hence not-*p*,

which says nothing about truth or falsity and hence scarcely supports the indispensability of semantical concepts. It does, however, raise the prospect that the putative *subjects* of truth-predications—sentences, propositions, statements, or whatever the most suitable label for them may be—are entities to which we often profess reference even when their semantic properties are not explicitly at issue. Once an ontology of prospective truth-bearers has been established, further acceptance of 'true' and 'false' as predicates over this domain is no great affair. (However, "reference" and "subject of predication" are not yet concepts which can be trusted to bear much dialectical weight.)

(*iii*) I am a frequent audience for the statements issued by Dr. Gotta Wysoff in his professional capacity as a consulting physician/research scientist/ political columnist/weather forecaster/etc. I would very much like to know how often, and under what circumstances, what he says is true.

(*iv*) Why should I care how we actually use the term 'true'? Admittedly I have undertaken to produce statements in which this word figures, but why not generate these by a process which selects for elegance of phrase and artistic conceit? Because I am doing my best to insure that what I say about Truth is *true*.

My concern in cases like (*iii*) is to arrive at beliefs roughly of form

(3)   When W says 'p' under conditions C, 'p' is true with probability (or relative
         frequency) r,

while (*iv*) may be formalized as my desire that

(4)   I never claim 'p' under conditions C unless 'p' is true.

Judgments of form (3) are profoundly important for my real-world survival, insomuch as they are the means by which I monitor the degree to which I accept what I hear from others. And although de facto violations of (4) do not often trouble my physical weal, I cannot abandon active *endeavors* of this form without profoundly revising my most basic personal values.

To be sure, one may still question whether the truth-ascriptions in (3, 4) are pragmatically essential. Perhaps in any practical context (3) and (4) can respectively be paraphrased into one or another of, e.g.,

(5a)   When W says that-p under C, that-p is the case with probability (or relative
          frequency) r,

(5b)   'p' has reliability/credibility/trustworthiness r,
          When W says 'p' under C
(5c)   'p' should be believed to degree r,

(5d) The probability that p, conditional upon W's saying that-p under C, is r,

(6a)   it is the case that p,
(6b)   it is highly certain that p,
          I never claim that-p under C unless
(6c)   I am convinced that p
(6d)   I have strong evidence that p,

from which explicit semantic concern has apparently been eliminated. Whether or not (3, 4) do, in fact, decently paraphrase into one or another of (5a-d, 6a-d), and what should be

said more generally about the subtle but important differences among these forms, is obviously problematic in ways present discussion is not yet positioned to resolve. (My contention would be that the only alternatives suggested here which can adequately substitute for (3, 4), namely (5a) and (6a), respectively, involve exactly the same semantic considerations as do the former.) But to the extent that forms (3, 5a-d) or (4, 6a-d) are not mutually equivalent, they and other constructions incorporating their right-hand clauses are *all* vital to me for one purpose or another. Moreover, not even the most tolerantly loose paraphrasing will remove any of these from subsumption under generic form[1]

If $P(\text{'}p\text{'})$ then $Q(\text{'}p\text{'})$

or

If $P(\text{that-}p)$ then $Q(\text{that-}p)$,

in which the grammatical subjects of predicates 'P' and 'Q' must be understood as a universally quantified variable if the *generality* of concern in (*iii, iv*) is to be captured.

II

None of examples (ii-iv) firmly establish the indispensability of truth-predications. Rather, they make evident something more basic than that, namely, that the concept of "truth" finds its practical sustenance in *appraisals of sayings*. Let me formulate this as innocuously as possible. Consider the sentence-form

(7a) Person o at time t says 'p' in fashion w,

or more briefly, absorbing the time reference into the subject term,

(7b) o w-says 'p'.

Let a sentence S arising in natural usage of the English language be called a "*say*-sentence" if, by ordinary intuitions of close paraphrase, some sentence of form (7) is an acceptable even if awkwardly stylized paraphrase of S. Some examples of *say*-sentences are

'I love you'	John murmured	tenderly,
'Give me your money'	snarled the bandit	to Mary,
'It rained last night'	John wrote	deceitfully,
'How badly does it hurt'	said the dentist	fearfully.
'I'll bet you do!'	scoffed John	loudly.

in which the manner of saying is split between verb and adverb. Similarly, we may class as "*nearsay*-sentences" those which, though not quite intuitively equivalent to any say-sentence, can nonetheless acceptably replace or be replaced by one for many practical purposes. Examples of *nearsay*-sentences are

After his conviction, Jones finally admitted the charge.

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[1]With the partial exception of (5d), whose form as a conditional sentential-probability assertion has special complex obscurities of its own.

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Jones denied having any accomplices.

What I would now like to assert is that *say*-sentences and *nearsay*-sentences, or their gerundizations, characterize events of a rather special sort, and that taking cognizance of such events and their constituents in various ways is indispensable to effective management of my real-world affairs. But having not yet justified the ontic and semantic presumptions of such a claim, I submit instead only that without the use of *say*/*nearsay*-sentences and other expressions derivative from them my existence would be scarcely less brutish and short than were I to be deprived of language altogether. If so, then any semantic concepts and principles which inhere in this usage are as secure or anyways as inescapable a foundation for philosophical semantics as any I can hope to establish.

To search my usage of *say*/*nearsay*-sentences for philosophic insights, some specimens are needed. Since the most obvious way to use a say -sentence is to say it, one important class of such specimens is described by *metasay*-sentences such as

‘I said, ‘You’re a silly ass’ ’, John repeated to his startled supervisor,

‘The dealer insists that our warrantee has expired’, whimpered Mary,

‘If your client will plead guilty, we’ll reduce the charge to manslaughter’, the prosecutor promised John’s lawyer,

which are *say*-sentences whose enclosed quotations—themselves enclose a *say-* or *nearsay*-sentence. However, there are other “uses”, most naturally described by expressions similar to metasay-sentences but not happily construed as perfect paraphrases thereof, which also need to be acknowledged. Consider

(8) John said to himself irately, ‘Mary told Jane, ‘John has 13 toes’ ’.	John said to himself irately, ‘Mary told Jane that I have 13 toes’.	John said to himself irately, ‘Mary told Jane my secret’.
John was irate that Mary told Jane, John has 13 toes.	John was irate that Mary told Jane that he has 13 toes.	John was irate that Mary told Jane his secret.
John was angered by Mary’s telling Jane, ‘John has 13 toes’.	John was angered by Mary’s telling Jane that he has 13 toes.	John was angered by Mary’s telling Jane his secret.

Even if the variance within this array is no more than the *say*/*nearsay* contrast, my so-far vague characterization of this did not assume it to be semantically unimportant. If the specimens in array (8) are not wholly equivalent even conditional upon

(9a) John’s secret is ‘John has 13 toes’,

or

(9b) John’s secret is that he has 13 toes,

I had best not select one as paradigm over another until considering what may be the significance of these differences.

(The structure of my development is unpleasantly complicated at this point. I claim that certain uses of *say*-sentences or something like that—call them *sayuses*—carry semantical commitments which in real life I can no more escape than I can avoid the *sayuses* which commit me to them. I can argue in this vein, however, only by *using* expressions which purport to describe, denote, or otherwise function as linguistic counterparts of the *sayuses* which the discussion is about. I must be cautious how I word these expressions lest my choice implicitly beg crucial issues; and that caution, in turn, amounts to *concern for saying about sayings about sayings*, or some *nearsay* approximation thereto, which is dizzly high on the metalinguistic hierarchy. Fortunately, ascent to this rarified level needs be only momentary.)

The phenomena of main interest in array (8) are the semi-equivalences within each row given (9), the direct-to-indirect quotation shift from the first to second row (and column), and gerundization of the subordinate clause in row three. I shall discuss them in that order, overlooking subtleties arising from their interaction.

Since the first row of (8) describes three different metasayings, regardless of (9), why do these nonetheless feel so interchangeable? Surely because we judge that for John himself, privy as he is to his own secrets, it makes no practical difference which of the embedded *say*-sentences he tells himself. When we use sentences of form

(10) *o w*-says, ____

we allow the blank to be filled not merely by sentences in quotes, but also by sentences prefixed by 'that' as well as many other unquoted phrases having no grammatical relation to sentences, such as 'my secret' in (8) and 'the charge' in previous examples. Indeed, if 'E' is an unquoted expression of the latter sort, we generally regard an expression of form 'E is that p' and, though somewhat less naturally, 'E is 'p', as perfectly good sentences so long as 'p' itself is (cf. (9a, b)); and accept *o w*-says E, E is that p; therefore *o w*-says that p', and sometimes '*o w*-says E, E is 'p'; therefore *o w*-says 'p' ', as grammatically well-formed deductively sound arguments. Clearly we treat what fills the blank in (10) grammatically as a *name*, i.e. as a nominative phrase which functions as a subject of predication. This status is further confirmed by any number of examples in which such expressions are unhesitantly accepted as substitution instances of variables of quantification, e.g.,

Did John tell you anything while I was out? Yes, he said that he'll accept our offer,

The *Examiner* has never retracted an editorial accusation, so it will not likely withdraw Thursday's tirade against the Governor,

and examples (*iii*, *iv*) above. Thus the intuitive near-equivalence of (8)'s columns given (9a) or (9b) is just the inter-inferrability of two statements 'Pa' and 'Pb' given identity statement $a = b$. To be sure, a peculiarity remains here in that we balk at

(9c) 'John has 13 toes' is that John has 13 toes,

which would follow were we to accept (9a, b) jointly. Even so, there is clearly an important connection of some sort between the two sides of (9c). I shall turn to that in a moment.

As every philosopher of language today well knows, the conclusion that direct and indirect quotations function as nominatives with full quantificational and identity-substitutional privileges in many if not all of their most important contexts of usage is fraught with ontic

import. ("To be is to be the value of a variable.") In the present structure of argument, however, exploitation of that import is still premature. Essential for now is just that not only does natural language use direct and indirect quotations nominatively: I for one could not get by in the real world without this usage. Until such time as I am shown how to forego it in favor of some alternative linguistic economy *which I can actually live by*, I cannot take seriously any semantic/ontological thesis which disowns the commitments of that usage.

For contrasting direct with indirect quotation, the full complexity of (8) is not needed. Instances of forms

(11a)   '*p*',
    o w-says
(11b)   that *p*,

will suffice. If (11a) and (11b) are not paraphrastically equivalent—and it would be strange to so regard them when, e.g.,

(12a)   'Mike's auto has a flat',
    John just reported
(12b)   'There's a flat on Mike's car',

each intuitively entail[2] *both* of

(13a)   Mike's auto has a flat,
    John just reported that
(13b)   there's a flat on Mike's car,

even though (l2a, b) not merely do not entail each other but are incompatible given that John uttered only one sentence—then it remains to clarify the analytic connection which evidently links (11a) and (11b) somehow. In particular, may not one of the two be conceptually dependent upon the other? This question is, I submit, settled rather conclusively by the following considerations.

(1) As a rule, though with a number of qualifications and exceptions, whenever '*p*' is an expression which I can assert to myself (i.e., '*p*' is a declarative sentence in my language; it is possible for me to believe/disbelieve that *p*), a direct quotation of form (11a) intuitively entails the corresponding indirect quote of form (11b). (Examples (12a, 13a) and (12b, 13b) illustrate the point.) The more important qualifications are: (a) If the direct quote contains pronouns, demonstratives, or other context-dependent terms, the entailed indirect quotation modifies these in keeping with the user's perspective. E.g., 'John told me, 'You're a silly ass' ' implies 'John told me that I'm a silly ass', not 'John told me that you're a silly ass'. (b) If the directly quoted sentence is "ambiguous" for me (see below), what is implied is a disjunction of

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[2]No technical and hence controversial sense of "entailment" is intended here. Rather, I mean to recognize by this phrase no more than certain aspects of how I in fact use words, namely, that some sentences '*p*' and '*q*' are so related for me that believing that-*p* induces me to believe that-*q* as well.

disambiguating indirect quotes. E.g.,' 'I got carried away', admitted John' entails roughly 'John said either that he was bodily removed or that he lost self-control'. (c) some contexts of usage or values for the nonsentential variables in (11a) weaken or suppress its intuitive entailment of the corresponding (11b), as in ' 'Polly wants a cracker', spoke the parrot with remarkable fidelity', ' 'My name is John' articulated Juan laboriously at his first English lesson', and ' 'Mother is dying' histrionically voiced the actor'. Even when some instance of (11a) does not intuitively entail the corresponding instance of (11b), however, the latter is still an assertable sentence for me so long as 'p' is.

(2) On the other hand, given a *say/nearsay* sentence-pair of form (11a, b) in which 'p' is assertable, there are many ways to replace the verb phrase ('w-says') with another verb which preserves the indirect quotation's intuitive assertability while deranging that of the correlative direct quote—e.g.,

(14a)   that he passed the exam.
    John is confident
(15a)   'I passed the exam'.

(14b)   that the cream is sour.
    John fears
(15b)   'The cream is sour'.

(14c)   that the door was ajar.
    John noticed
(15c)   'The door is ajar'.

(14d)   that the weather will clear by evening.
    John expects
(15d)   'The weather will clear by evening'.

(14e)   that the meeting will begin on time.
    John intends
(15e)   'The meeting will begin on time'.

A great many of the predications most essential to my inter- and intrapersonal affairs are of *nearsay* form

(16) o ϕs that p,

or some ellipsis thereof (such as 'John wants to go', the force of which comes clear only under paraphrase 'John wants that John will go', in contrast to, say, 'John wants that someone else

will go'); and for only a small proportion of such ϕ-verbs does replacement of the indirect quotation by any direct quote yield a usable sentence in my language.[3]

The conclusion looming here is that certain verbings of indirect quotes do a job for which direct quotation is of no avail. However, '*o* ϕs that *p*' ↔ '*o* ϕs '*p*' ' is not the only possible interchange between direct and indirect quotation. Perhaps for each *nearsay*-verb 'ϕ' (i.e., one which participates naturally in sentences of form (16)), there exists a corresponding verb-phrase 'ϕ^*' such that

(17) *o* ϕ^*s '*p*'

is related to '*o* ϕs that *p*' essentially as '*o w*-says '*p*' ' is related to '*o w*-says that *p*'. Indeed, example (8) has already suggested one such possibility, namely,

o says ϕingly to himself, '*p*'.

Thus in a direct-quote counterpart to (14a-e) we would have

(18a) John says confidently to himself, 'I passed the exam'.

(18b) John says fearfully to himself, 'The cream is sour'.

(18c) John said noticingly (perceptively? observantly?) to himself, 'The door is ajar'.

(18d) John says expectantly to himself, 'The weather will clear by evening'.

(18e) John says intendingly (optingly? purposefully? decisively?) to himself, 'The meeting will begin on time'.

But how unnaturally contrived these seem! Their root oddity lies in our normal usage of 'say', to which I shall turn in a moment; but first we may note that by the general implication of (11b) by (11a), were series (14) derivative from and satisfactorily replaceable by series (18), the former should be essentially interchangeable with

(19a) John says confidently to himself that he passed the exam.

(19b) John says fearfully to himself that the cream is sour.

(19c) John said noticingly (perceptively? observantly?) to himself that the door was ajar.

(19d) John says expectantly to himself that the weather will clear by evening.

(19e) John says intendingly (optingly? purposefully? decisively?) to himself that the meeting will begin on time.

But even where (19a-e) make intuitive sense (and it is hard to imagine how one might naturally use some of them), they are not all equivalent to their respective counterparts in (14a-e). For insomuch as I can ϕingly say '*p*' (or that-*p*) to another person without myself ϕing that

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[3]Suffixing 'true' to the ϕ-verb, as suggested by Quine (1960, 212ff), gains nothing but further oddity for direct-quote series [15]. We can always elect to construe '*o* ϕs '*p*' ' or '*o* ϕs-true '*p*' ', as a stylistic variant of '*o* ϕs that *p*', but unless we can make sense of the former without appeal to the latter, that weakens the primacy of indirect quotation not a whit.

p, there is no evident reason why I cannot also ϕingly tell myself that p even when I do not ϕ that p. Thus, I may tell myself confidently that there is no danger in an attempt to override any deep suspicion that there very well is danger.

More generally, for few if any of the *nearsay*-verbs 'hope', 'dread', 'believe', 'doubt', 'imagine', 'expect', 'perceive', 'remember', 'intend', 'consider', etc. do my present linguistic resources provide a modifier 'w_ϕ' of *say*-verbs[4] such that '$o\ w_\phi$-says 'p' ' intuitively entails '$o\ \phi$s that p' even when 'p' and the context of utterance are such that '$o\ w$-says 'p' ' entails '$o\ w$-says that p' for most ordinary *say*-verb modifiers. Of course, we can always introduce a *say*-adverb 'w_ϕ' whose definition includes ϕing that-p as a condition on w_ϕ-saying 'p', but that would leave the latter conceptually derivative from the former. Similar remarks apply to the possibility that 'ϕ^*' in (17) might be other than a modified *say*-verb. Contemporary English (and, I suspect, any other living language) simply does not contain any non*say*-verbs which accept direct quotes as grammatical objects while entailing some verbing of an indirect quote; and while we can always introduce some such 'ϕ^*' by a theory which includes implication of (16) by (17) in this verb's implicit or explicit definition, our usage of 'ϕing that p' would remain basic to that of 'ϕ^*ing 'p' '.

(3) Not long ago I touched upon "ambiguity" and quickly moved away. Is this one of the concepts which philosophical semantics cannot presume without begging basic questions, or is there something pretechnically indispensable about it? Consider

(20a) John got carried away.

(20b) John said, 'I got carried away'.

(20c) John said that he got carried away.

(20d) John was bodily removed.

(20e) John lost self-control.

(20f) John tog deirrac away.

The first and most fundamental point about these six sentences is that my intuitive reaction to two of them—not just my overt response, which is negligible, but a congeries of internal adjustments that in vastly complicated and poorly understood ways dispose altered responses to other stimuli while appearing introspectively as a poorly verbalizable feeling-tone—share a character that differentiates them in one way from my reactions to three of the others and from the remaining one in still another. Common to my reactions to (20b, d, e) is what might be described vaguely as "smooth integration into my current functioning", much as featured by my reactions to a traffic light when it is variously green, amber, and red. To (20a, c), on the other hand, I react like to a traffic light shining both red and green, and to (20f) like to one shining blue—a conflict between otherwise well-integrated reactions on the one hand and disruptive bafflement on the other. No matter how badly I characterize this reactive difference in me, the difference is nonetheless *there*, and plays a central role in how I govern my verbal economy. For on occasions when I register an "ambiguous" or "meaningless" reaction to a given sentence, as I now[5] do to (20a, c) and (20f), respectively, I stigmatize that sentence as

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[4]A "*say*-verb", modified or otherwise, may be defined as any verb 'ψ' such that '$o\ \psi$s x' intuitively entails 'o says x'.

[5]But not necessarily at another time. Meaninglessness or ambiguity can come and go from moment to moment with changes in context, semantic satiation, and who-knows-what other psychodynamic factors.

defective and try to suppress my use of it—or at least such suppression does tend consequently to occur—in my believings, desirings, and other verbings of indirect quotes.

Precisely what I attempt to do about sentences which I intuit as ambiguous is a complicated story involving semantical concepts not yet here legitimized. For now, it serves to note (*a*) that a given expression '*p*' is defective for me as a sentence unless '*o w*-says '*p*' ' intuitively entails '*o w*-says that p^{*}' (where 'p^{*}' is either '*p*' or, if appropriate, a perspectival adjustment thereof) for most normal completions of these schemata; (*b*) that I intuit '*p*' as "ambiguous" if and, essentially, only if for two or more sentences 'q_1', ..., 'q_n' not paraphrastically equivalent for me, '*o w*-says '*p*' ' intuitively entails '*o w*-says either that 'q_1' or ... or that 'q_n' (but no reduction of this disjunction) for at least some values of *o* and *w*; and (*c*) that when '*p*' so intuits as ambiguous for me, I seek to replace '*p*' with one or another of 'q_1', ..., 'q_n' in my own verbings of indirect quotes. Even if this report on my management of ambiguity is not completely accurate, it still points up the regency of indirect over direct quotation in my cognitive affairs. There are ways in which I monitor my use of words for which (11b), as distinct from (11a), is absolutely essential.

(4) Consider the *nearsay* implications, or lack thereof, of

(21a) 'Polly wants a cracker', chattered parrot Poll.

(21b) 'My name is John' stumbled out Juan at his first English lesson.

(21c) 'Oh, pshaw!' said Mary abruptly.

(21d) 'Glaup', said baby Jim happily.

I infer no indirect quotation from (21c) or (21d) because 'Oh, pshaw' and 'Glaup' are not acceptable (assertable) sentences for me. But why am I reluctant to allow that (2la, b) respectively entail

(22a) Parrot Poll said that she wanted a cracker,

(22b) Juan said that his name was John,

when I have no objection to the quoted sentences and would happily use them for indirect quotation in another context? Is it that "chattering" and "stumbling out" do not count as ways of saying? Perhaps—but if so, I can easily replace the verb-phrases in (2la, b) with explicit *say*-verbs and still reject inference from direct to indirect quotation in these contexts. On the other hand, is (21d) really of a kind with *say*-sentences, examined previously? Perhaps it should be rewritten as

'Glaup', "said" baby Jim happily,

with its verb in qualm-flags to signal a deviant or extended usage. But if 'say' itself can occur deviantly, may not the *say*-verbs in (2la, b) (and (21c)?) likewise be deviant there?

Examples like these make evident that *say*-verbs are generally ambiguous—or at least *would* be, did not context usually resolve their potential ambiguity for me. In the strong sense, saying '*p*' entails a corresponding indirect-quote saying; in the weak sense, it does not.[6] Both

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[6]Perhaps we should also recognize additional senses of 'say' to distinguish communications like [21c] from bare

strong and weak sayings require the sayer to utter sounds of a certain kind,[7] but strong saying demands more than that, namely, whatever needs be added to sounding-out to warrant inference to indirect quotation. How best to explicate strong saying is not immediately evident. The differences among, e.g.,

(23a) *o* sounds out '*p*' and says that *p*,

(23b) *o* says that-*p* by sounding out '*p*',

(23c) *o* sounds out '*p*' in order to say that *p*,

(23d) *o* sounds out '*p*', and '*p*' says that *p*,

are sufficiently provocative to suggest that a convincing analysis of strong saying cannot be had apart from a reasonably advanced theory of linguistic functioning. The same holds, moreover, even for the weak sense of *say*-verbs, insomuch as probing for where a person's sound emissions (belches, knuckle-crackings, footfalls, etc.) fail to count as "sayings" of any sort brings out that weak saying qualifies as such only through resemblance to the overt aspects of strong saying. Not merely does the notion of *w*-saying that-*p* not depend on that of *w*-saying '*p*', the reverse obtains even for weak sayings.

Or should I say, rather, that direct- and indirect-quote sayings are *both* dependent upon some non*say* verbings of indirect quotation? For surely, *o* can *w*-say that *p* only through some utterance whose strong *w*-saying entails *w*-saying that *p*. To break out of this analytic circle, we need to identify in non-*say* terms whatever must be added to bare utterance of '*p*' to make of it a saying that *p*. Common sense by no means lacks views on this. Thus, one would ordinarily not allow that *o* strongly *w*-says '*p*' unless '*p*' *means* or *expresses* that-*p* for *o*. However, while this formulation will soon be approved, I shall not insist on it just yet, partly because 'meaning' is more complicated as a verb than as a noun, and also because the requirements on some strong sayings involve more than just what the utterance means to its sayer. (E.g., while John can proclaim that-*p* in a language understood only by himself, he cannot reveal that-*p* unless his overt vocalization means that-*p* to his audience as well—cf. Austin on "perlocutionary acts".) Eventually, it may well prove possible to describe the difference between strong and weak *w*-saying without recourse to any quotations at all, namely, through theoretical concepts yet to be developed by the psychology of language (see below). Meanwhile, indirect quotation characterizes in its own way whatever in *saying* is more than bare sounding, and is the only linguistic resource we now have for distinguishing strong from weak direct-quote *say*-sentences. Once again, indirect quotation stands revealed as more fundamental for practical discourse than is direct quotation.

With this last point in hand, I can deepen my comments on generic *nearsay*-sentence form (16). The main reason why replacing the ϕ-verbs in examples (14a-e) by explicit soy-verbs seems so unnatural a paraphrase of the former, even when, as in (19a-e), the indirect quotes are left unaltered, is simply that *w*-saying requires *uttering*; whereas if old J.B. Watson is not to

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soundings like [21d]. And what should we do with cases like 'The native said 'Gavagai erb gloxum' ', which we suspect supports an indirect quotation but have no idea which?

[7]Can one also "say" in writing, or is that another deviant usage? There is no evident intuitive objection to *o*'s saying '*p*' by either oral or written production so long as *o* thereby says that *p*; but whether we would accept baby Jim's nonsense scribbles or parrot Poll's fortuitously sentential sequence of typewriter-key pecks as "saying" even in the weakest sense is another question. For simplicity of exposition, I shall restrict "saying" to oral behavior and leave written language to verb for itself.

prevail after all over outraged common sense and the past 50 years of progress in psychonomic science, one needs not make sounds in order to believe/fear/observe/expect/intend. People do indeed often talk audibly to themselves while hoping, contemplating, doubting, desiring, etc., but, so far as we have any reason to believe, they more often do not. Whatever constitutes such ϕings-that-p undoubtedly *disposes w*-saying that-p for some w appropriate to ϕ, but that scarcely justifies viewing the former as a sort of miniaturized, ectoplasmic copy of sentence-uttering.[8] Even if ϕing that-p is importantly *like* certain soundings in some respects, it remains to determine even crudely what those respects may be—to identify, e.g., some sense in which a person might "say" 'p' to himself even when he produces no sound patterned 'p' nor engages any of the musculature by which he utters sentences.

This concludes my disquisition on direct vs. indirect quotation. However, there still remains a brief but important flurry of observations to be made on the force of gerundization in array (8). For economy of expression, the last two rows of (8) may be condensed as

(24a) John was irate that Mary told,

(24b) John was angered by Mary's telling,

to which for comprehensiveness should be adjoined

(24c) John was angered by the fact that Mary told.

These bring out, first of all, that English provides at least three ways to transform a declarative sentence into a noun phrase without altering its manifest descriptive content; namely, by (1) prefixing 'that' or (2) 'the fact that' to the unmodified sentence,[9] or (3) by gerundizing the sentence's main verb. (That the clauses following 'by' in (24b, c) function as nominatives is shown *inter alia* by the intuitive entailment of

John was angered by something

by both (24b) and (24c).[10]) Moreover, at least the first two of these yield fundamentally *different* nominalizations'—i.e., 'that Mary told' and 'Mary's telling' are not at all paraphrastically equivalent. Since the nuances of particular contexts easily obscure the generic difference between 'that-p' and 'Gp', where 'G' designates the gerundization operator, this is best appreciated from a more extended array of examples such as (25) (which well merits fuller discussion than what I shall make of it here).

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[8]On the full-bodiedness of dispositions, see Rozeboom, 1973.

[9]More generally, 'the fact that p' is only one member (though perhaps the most important) of a class of sentence-nominalizations of form 'the _____ that p'. Other instances are 'the proposition that p, 'the event that p', 'the possibility that p', 'the hope that p', and more generally though not exclusively, 'the ϕ^* that p' for some idiomatic variant 'ϕ^*' of any *nearsay*-verb 'ϕ'. The extent to which, if at all, these invoke ontologies beyond those of the nominalization operators in (24a, b, c) is a worthy question for some other occasion.

[10]Interestingly, existential generalization over the nominative 'that'-clause in (24a) is strongly nonidiomatic (John was irate something'). This peculiarity resides in the intransitive main verb, which is not grammatically entitled to an object despite its occurrence in (24a) as stylistic variant on what is most properly an active construction. However, unlike many similar cases in English (e.g., 'John is afraid that Mary told', which readily reverts to 'John fears that Mary told'), neither 'is irate' nor its equivalent 'is angry' has a transitive counterpart ('ires'? 'angs'?) in common usage. Even so, 'John ires that Mary told', which comfortably entails 'John ires something', brings out the intuitive logical structure of [24].

(25)

John (ired?) that Mary told.	John was irate that Mary told.	John (ired?) Mary's telling	John was angry about Mary's telling.	John was angered by Mary's telling.
John feared that Mary told.	John was afraid that Mary told.	John feared Mary's telling.	John was afraid of Mary's telling.	John was frightened by Mary's telling.
John doubted that Mary told	John was doubtful that Mary told.	John doubted Mary's telling.	John was doubtful about Mary's telling.	John was doubtful due to telling.
John saw that Mary told.	John was visually informed that Mary told	John say Mary's telling.	John was visually informed of Mary's telling.	John was visually informed by Mary's telling.
John said that Mary told.	John was be-spoke?) that Mary told.	John spoke of Mary's telling.	John (was be-spoke?) of Mary's telling.	John was moved to speak by Mary's telling.
John desired that that Mary tell.	John was desirous that Mary tell.	John desired Mary's telling.	John was de-sirous of Mary's telling.	John desired as a result of Mary's telling.
John cared not that Mary told.	John was indif-ferent that Mary told.	John (indiffered?) Mary's telling.	John was indif-ferent to Mary's telling.	John was un-affected by Mary's telling.
John urged that Mary tell.	John was urgent that Mary tell.	John urged Mary's telling.	John was urgent about Mary's telling.	John was an urge to Mary's telling.
?	John was to blame that Mary told	?	John was blamed for Mary's telling.	John was blamed due to Mary's telling.
John caused that Mary told.	?	John caused Mary's telling.	?	John was in-strumental in Mary's telling.

   To begin, the first and second columns of (25) are evidently equivalent except where English idiom lacks fluency on one side or another of the transitive/intransitive interchange. The same is true of columns Three and Four, though one's first careless tendency to regard these as roughly interchangeable with columns One and Two, respectively, is somewhat weaker for column Four than for column Three. That the two pairs of columns are *not* equivalent in our primary interpretations of these constructions, however, is demonstrated by the intuitive entailment of

   (26) Mary told

by all sentences in the last three columns of (25) (except in contexts where we elect to under-stand one or another of these simply as a stylistic variant on its column-One-or-Two counter-part), whereas this seems true for only a few of the principal verbs in columns One and Two, namely, 'caused it that', 'was to blame that', 'saw that', and perhaps 'was irate that'. Moreover, the negations of sentences in column Three to Five likewise all entail (26), whereas this is true of none in columns One and Two. Failure of that-p to be the case systematically defeats sentences which contain 'Gp' (except where 'Gp' in turn lies within the scope of a 'that-__' operator) in the same way, intuitively, as sentences containing a definite description are defeated by failure of the description to be satisfied.

On the other hand, given (26), the sentences in columns One and Two intuitively entail their counterparts in columns Three and Four, but *not* in general conversely. Thus John can be angry about Mary's telling without necessarily being angry that Mary told—he may, for example, be annoyed only that Mary's telling was so theatrical. Further, with two exceptions, column Five exhibits sentences of form 'o ψs Gp' (or better, of form '$\psi(o, Gp)$') whose principal verbs are simple variants on their row-wise precursors, yet which are intuitively independent of all corresponding sentences of form 'o ϕs that p' even given (26). E.g., Mary's telling can anger John by means other than causing John to be aware that Mary told, say, by inducing Jim to take actions which John finds offensive. (The exceptions are the last two rows of (25), whose entries in columns One and Two, however, intuitively deviate from the character of the others.[11]) Whatever needs ultimately to be said about relations between 'that-p' and 'Gp', it is evident that one is not even roughly a paraphrastic variant of the other.

What about the construction 'the fact that p'? In most if not all natural occurrences of this in context such as 'o is aware of ____ ', 'is due to ____ ', 'accounts for ____ ', and the like, 'the fact that p' can with complete intuitive comfort be paraphrased by the gerundization of 'p'. On the other hand, there are many contexts in which 'Gp' cannot happily be replaced by 'the fact that p' (e.g., most entries in column Three of (25)). It would appear that while gerundization and 'the fact that ____ ' operator are basically equivalent, there are ambiguities and overtones in the latter which warn against trusting everyday fact-talk to support much philosophic overburden. Even so, we can feel sure that 'the fact that p' does not generally equate with 'that p', for seldom if ever (save ellipses as noted in footnote 11) can the former replace the latter in 'o ϕs that p' even when the ϕing requires that-p to be the case. (Cf. 'John learned that Mary told' vs. 'John learned the fact that Mary told'—not to be confused with the equivalence between 'John learned of Mary's telling' and 'John learned of the fact that Mary told'.) Thus by the paraphrase test, whatever the-fact-that-p may be, it is not, contrary to frequent proposal, a true proposition. (On the other hand, predicates '____ is a fact' and 'It is a fact ____ ' do seem to apply to true propositions—whence the paradoxical conclusion that the-fact-that-p is not a fact.[12])

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[11]At times, as in 'That John was habitually late led to his dismissal', the 'the fact that ...' operator is elided of its first two words. Thus it is not untoward to propose that 'John caused it that Mary told' and 'John was to blame that Mary told' are best construed as ellipses for 'John caused the fact that Mary told' and 'John was to blame for the fact that Mary told', respectively.

[12]More properly, we should conclude that 'That-p is a fact' is ambiguous, paraphrasing as 'It is a fact that p' (equivalently, 'It is the case that p') in one sense, and as 'Gp is a fact' in another. The latter lacks idiomatic naturalness, but only because appropriate occasions for its usage are rare. 'Mary's telling is a fact' is of a kind with 'Mary exists'. Although 'fact' and 'existent' are useful terms under which to generalize, their ascription to specific instances like Mary's-telling and Mary, respectively, is largely otiose for the simple reason that any assertion in which 'Mary's telling' or 'Mary' is the grammatical subject of an extensional predication presupposes, respectively, that Mary's telling is a fact or that Mary exists.

My description of gerundization as a "nominalization" operator presages the final point to be noted from array (8), namely, that not only does everyday English freely accept gerundized declarative sentences as grammatical subjects/objects of predication, this is in particular importantly true of *say-* and *nearsay*-sentences—i.e., we find abundant use for sentences of form

o's-ϕing-that-p is Q,

in which the predication may (as in (25)) or may not be manifestly relational.

III

Let me consolidate what has been gained so far. I first observed that the use of sentences whose grammatical object is direct or indirect quotation of another sentence is essential to my intellectual survival—which is simply to say that any philosophic thesis which impugns this usage without providing a practical alternative fails the test of real-world authenticity for me. (Of course that test is relevant only so far as I take philosophy seriously; but doctrines which I cannot live by are posturings for which I have no time.) I then argued at length that not merely does indirect quotation not derive from or reduce to direct quotation, but that the reverse dependency obtains. Since the latter implies, moreover, that "use" of indirect quotation is best described by meta-indirect quotation, my first point can be reformulated more insightfully as my inability and unwillingness to avoid participating in certain events which I can at present describe only by sentences of form

I ψ that o ϕs that p,

as an important special subclass of my self-descriptions of form

I ϕ that p.

Moreover, my willingness to nominalize, by direct/indirect quotation and gerundization, any sentence 'p' such that I ϕ that-p for certain ϕ results in my cognitions of form ψing that-p including ones of the more determinate forms

(27i) I ψ that $Q(n_i[p])$ (i = A, B, C, D, E),

(28ij) I ψ that $R(n_i[p], n_j[q])$ (ij = A, B, C, D, E),

where $n_i[\mathrm{p}]$ is a nominal clause of form

$n_A[p] =_{\text{def}}$ 'p',

$n_B[p] =_{\text{def}}$ that-p,

$n_C[p] =_{\text{def}}$ Gp,

$n_D[p] =_{\text{def}}$ o's w-saying 'p' (i.e. G(o w-says 'p')),

$n_E[p] =_{\text{def}}$ o's ϕing that p (i.e. G(o ϕs that p)).

Forms (21i, 28ij) (together with others of respectively similar character in which 'p' is subsentential) subsume most of the great problems of philosophy. In particular, they comprehend my theory of *language* when i = A, my theory of *meaning* when i = B, my *science and ontology*

when $i =$ C, my theory of *speech-acts* when $i =$ D, and my theory of *intentionality* (mental psychology) when $i =$ E. Within my general theory of meaning is my theory of *semantics* in the classic sense, namely, beliefs of form (28BB, BC) and secondarily (28AA, AB, AC), in which (28AA, AB, BB) covers syntactic and meaning relations (notably entailment and synonymy) while (28AC, BC) concerns *aboutness* (i.e., reference, designation, denotation, representation, and their like). A richer conception of semantics, however, would also explicity include my beliefs of form (28EB, EC, EE).

No theory of entities of a given kind can fairly be held responsible for all conceivable properties and relations over its subject-domain. Hence while form-classes (27*i*, 28*ij*) provide a framework within which to develop a systematically comprehensive treatment of semantics and allied topics, one foundational task still remaining for that inquiry is (*i*) to compile from ordinary language, technical philosophy and innovative imagination an inventory of conceivable predicates '*Q*' and '*R*' of each type *i* or *ij* in (27, 28); (*ii*) to discard from this inventory any which clearly fail to sustain any philosophic interest; and (*iii*) to bare whatever connections may integrate the remainder. Unless the latter divide into two or more essentially unrelated subsets, we can best treat them as constituting the scope of a unified theory of *pan-semantics*.[13] (Alternatively, if they do so divide, "pan-semantics" comprehends whatever integrated subset includes the classic semantical relations of entailment and reference.)

Characterizing pan-semantics as a subset of my cognitions of full form (27, 28) rather than of just the sentences indirectly quoted therein calls attention to yet another dimension of the theory of pan-semantics—or indeed, of any arbitrary topic T—too complex to be more than hinted at here yet too important to let pass entirely unnoted. If my set of cognitions {I ϕ_i that p_i} for a topic $\Upsilon =$ (that-p_i) is my declarative ("doxastic") theory of T when each ϕ_i is some degree of belief/disbelief, then my cognitions {I ψ_i that p_i}, where the ψ_i lie on some other dimension ψ of indirect-quote verbings, constitute my ψ-wise theory of topic T. Thus in addition to a declarative theory of T, I also have an *appraisive* theory of T where the ψ_i are degrees of esteem, an *optative* theory of T where the ψ_i are degrees of intent, and so on. Moreover, to the extent that I *monitor* my ψ-wise theory of T, i.e., undertake responsibility for its critique, I am thereby concerned about the degree to which I *ought* to ψ each that-p_i in T—which is to say that I am also characterized by cognitions of form

I ϕ that V (that I ψ_i that p_i),

where '*V*' is one or another deontic or evaluative predicate such as 'should', 'desirable', 'justified', 'meritorious', etc. But if such *V*-predicates or the grounds on which I ascribe them are at all of concern to pan-semantics when attributed to pan-semantical arguments—and their relevance will be evident in the sequel to this essay—then pan-semantics includes the study of its own normative methodology. That pan-semantics (like most philosophic topics) is reflexive is scarcely a new discovery. But it is worthwhile to make explicit the full logical structure of these recursions and to note how inextricably the entire multidimensional range of my personal *nearsay*-verbings weaves throughout them. Moreover, if pan-semantics has any critical import for a less-than-perfect object language, I must take its reflexiveness *seriously* (rather than seeking to evade it through a hierarchical theory of metalanguages) if my pan-semantical

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[13]I have no great craving to proliferate terminology, so in lieu of 'pan-semantics' we might instead refurbish 'semiotics' (cf. Morris, 1938) for this comprehensive purpose. However, the latter's etymological emphasis on overt symbols does not seem altogether appropriate here, nor do I consider its modern-classic trifurcation into "syntactics", "semantics", and "pragmatics" to be either as clear or as useful as first reaction might expect of it.

precepts and principles are not to imply their own defectiveness.

IV

Before I can properly commence (in the sequel) formulating even the most elementary of semantical principles, I need to delimit the domains over which these hope to generalize. (Talk about forms (27, 28) remains unconscionably vague until what counts as a filling of those forms can also be defined.) Specifically, for each nominal-clause form n_i' (and verb-form 'ϕ') in (27i, 28ij), I need a category-label 'K_i' such that for a particular expression 'x', I am committed to accepting 'x_i is a K_i' in an appropriately strong sense of "accept" iff I accept 'x' for use in those context which 'n_i' in (27, 28) attempts to demark. The common nouns I propose to coordinate with nominal forms 'n_A', …, 'n_E' and 'ϕ' therein are 'sentence', 'proposition', 'event', 'saying', 'intentional act', and 'intentional mode', respectively. Of these, 'proposition', 'intentional act', and 'intentional mode' are at once most basic, most controversial, most problematic, and hence most in need of careful construction here.

As a first approximation, it may be proposed that if o ϕs that p, then, by definition, that-p is a "proposition" while ϕ is an "intentional mode". Implementing that proposal, however, requires some work. The intent is for my use of 'proposition' and 'intentional mode' to be such that, with some possible exclusions, sentences in my language of form

   (29a) o ϕs that p,

where 'p' is also an acceptable sentence for me, entail the corresponding sentences of form

   (29b) That-p is a proposition,

and

   (29c) ϕ is an intentional mode.

In saying that, however, I have employed a concept—"sentence in my language"—whose obscurities are now critical. For even if it be agreed that a sentence-for-me is at least a visual or auditory pattern of some sort, what more it must also be is far from incontrovertibly clear. The problem is not just confining substitutions for 'p' in schema (29) to patterns which I can linguistically "use"; I must also insure that they are of the right logical type in order not to be committed to inferring, e.g., 'That painting is a proposition' from ' John admires that painting'. Were a stance on the matter needed here (which it is not), I would define 'S is a sentence in my language' roughly as 'S is a stimulus pattern which expresses a proposition for me'—which, however, discourages defining propositions, in turn, in terms of sentences.[14]

Moreover, examples like

(30) It was John's doing (i.e., John brought it about) that the fire was contained,

indicate why I do not want my inference from (29a) to (29c) to be universal in 'ϕ'. The

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[14]It is commonly assumed that 'sentence' is a purely syntactical concept which can be defined without reference to meanings or their equivalent. I dispute, however, that this can actually be brought off without implying that every pattern of sounds or shapes is a "sentence" in some language. My proffered definition of 'sentence for me' is rather similar to what often seems philosophically understood by 'statement'. According to my own ear for everyday English, however, "statements" are sentences being used in a special way, namely, to make assertions.

trouble here is not that 'that-the-fire-was-contained' fails to name a proposition. Rather, as shown by our reluctance to infer 'Peter doubted something that was John's doing jointly from (30) and 'Peter doubted that the fire was contained', 'that-*p*' expressions are in some contexts other than what they seem. (Cf. also footnote 11.) In (30), '*o* brought it about that *p*' can be disambiguated by paraphrasing it as '*o* brought about the fact that *p*' on the one hand and '*o* brought about its being the case that *p*' on the other. (In the second reading, but not the first, 'that *p*' presumably has the same referent as it does in '*o* doubts that *p*'.) In any event, some sentences of lexical form (29a) do not intuitively entail the corresponding sentences of forms (29b, c) even when '*p*' is a perfectly good sentence for me.

Even so, if I can discriminate word-strings which I can myself use for indirect quotation from those which I cannot. I can surely reflect that distinction by a verbal label. What I want are concepts of "proposition" and "intentional mode" such that for certain to-be-supplied verbs 'Ψ' and 'Φ',

> (31) I Ψ both (*a*) that something is a proposition if and only if someone Φs it, and also (*b*) that for any ϕ, if someone ϕs some proposition then ϕ is an intentional mode.

Verb 'Ψ' is to express whatever quasi-linguistic "usage" is my condition of maximal acceptance: 'Believe' will do, but 'am convinced', 'feel sure', 'am aware', or 'know' are better, and none of these attains the adequacy which future advances in cognitive psychology should eventually make possible. 'Φ' is to be the disjunction of a set of verbs which take only 'that'-prefixed sentences for their grammatical objects and whose constructions are never paraphrastically equivalent to ones in which 'that *p*' is replaced by 'G*p*'—verbs, that is, which do not tolerate juxtaposition with 'that'-phrases of the intuitively wrong sort. Subject to possible refinements, especially in the disjunction's breadth (see footnote 15), 'Φ' might be 'believes, disbelieves, or is uncertain', 'opines to some degree', or 'considers the possibility'. Note, however, that replacing 'Ψ' and 'Φ' by appropriately specific verbs does not totally eliminate the schematic character of (31), insomuch as the desire expressed by this paragraph's second sentence cannot be realized unless the terms 'proposition' and 'intentional mode' are meaningful to me. The status of (40) is that with appropriate substitutions for the verb-schemata, I can use (31) for self-description *if* I succeed in suitably defining the terms at issue.[15]

(But why not replace the first part of (31) with the simpler schema, '(*x*) (I Ψ that *x* is a proposition iff I Φ *x*)—e.g., when 'Ψ' and 'Φ' are taken to be 'know' and 'opine', respectively, by 'I know that something is a proposition iff I opine it'? Although this reflects the intended nature of my "proposition" concept more directly than does (31), neither direction of its biconditional is completely acceptable. On one hand, I want to allow that someone else might opine a proposition which I lack resources to conceive and hence cannot now opine. And on the other, since 'I know that *x* is a proposition' entails 'I opine that x is a proposition' (which would also be true for any other acceptable choice of 'Ψ' and 'Φ', if I am required to know

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[15](Footnote added after publication.) My attempt in (31-b) and (32b) to delimit the class of "intentional modes," and the extension of this approach in (35) and (37), does not seem entirely satisfactory. Intuitively, we would prefer 'John is not taller than the proposition that-*p*' (a contrived example) or 'The weather makes it likely that the game will be delayed' (an entirely natural one) not to entail, respectively, that *is not taller than* or *makes it likely* is an intentional mode. Some relations whose relata include propositions seem too remote from believing, fearing, contemplating, trying, etc. to be usefully included in a common species-category with the latter, which are additionally alike in playing a central role in the causal determination of human behavior. However, how to formulate that psychonomic property with technical exactitude and whether it is an intuitively sufficient addendum to (31-b), (35), (37) is not at all clear

that x is a proposition whenever I opine x, I am thereby also required to know that that-x-is-a-proposition is a proposition, and so on for an infinite progression of knowings. Turning the point around, I should not have to know that x is a proposition, even when I opine x, if I do not also know that I opine x. However, for any x which I not only opine but also know that I opine, I am committed under (31) to inferring that x is a proposition.)

Given a satisfactory choice of 'Φ' in (31), the definitions sought can—though need not—be taken to be

(32a) x is a proposition $=_{def}$ Someone Φs x,

(32b) ϕ is an intentional mode $=_{def}$ $(\exists x)$ (x is a proposition and someone ϕs x).

(Note that (32a) is stronger than strictly required in that (31)'s biconditional is not stipulated to be an analytic equivalence. An alternative definition might be able to treat x's being Φd as merely diagnostic, not definitive, of x's propositionhood.) That suitable selection of 'Φ' is trickier than might first appear, however, is shown by the following sample of definitional candidates:

(33a) x is a proposition $=_{def}$ $(\exists \phi)$ (Someone ϕs x),

(33b) x is a proposition $=_{def}$ Someone believes x,

(33c) x is a proposition $=_{def}$ Someone feels-sure x,

(33d) x is a proposition $=_{def}$ Someone opines x to some degree,

(33e) That _ is a proposition $=_{def}$ $(\exists \phi)$ (Someone ϕs that ____),

(33f) That _ is a proposition $=_{def}$ Someone to some degree opines or hopes
                                      or contemplates or perceives or remembers
                                      or intends or ... or regrets that ____ .

Since (33a) would outrageously count as "propositions" all material objects of all transitive verbs, major restrictions are evidently needed—the technical problem being how to make them. The restricted verb in (33b) is intuitively of the right sort, but presents another problem common to most verbs of its kind, namely, that it accepts a wider class of grammatical objects than just 'that'-clauses. Thus under (33b), if John believes his wife and the *New York Times*, the latter both count as propositions. Whether or not (33c) has a similar problem of entailing, e.g., that if John feels sure of himself then of-himself is a proposition, depends on whether the proposed equivalence is logical or lexical, i.e., whether each side of the equation is grammatically a predicate accepting only noun-phrases in place of 'x' or whether instead the left-hand word string abbreviates the word string on the right regardless of context. If (33c) is understood as a logical equivalence, then 'feels sure' does seem to tolerate only grammatical objects of the sort intuitively desired—except that not everything I want to count as a proposition is, so far as I have any reason to suspect, sure-felt by someone. (33d), on the other hand, appears free of both difficulties noted so far: If someone opines x, 'x' must be an assertable

sentence prefixed by 'that'; and if *o* entertains that-*p* in any fashion—hoping, or seeing, or intending, or regretting, or whatever—then surely (?) *o* also opines that-*p* somewhere within the range from utter confidence to neutral uncertainty to total disbelief. (Stipulating that (33d) is a logical equivalence blocks lexical implications such as from 'Turnips opine nothing to some degree' to 'Nothing is a proposition'.) Even so, my parenthetical '?' acknowledges the prospect of dispute; and one might in any case wonder if "opining to some degree" is so clear and indispensable a concept that philosophical semantics can securely build upon it. Finally, (33e, f) illustrate attempts at lexical paraphrase, exploiting the intuition that propositions are what we denote by 'that'-clauses. As a word-replacement rule, however, (33e) infers 'That painting is a proposition' from 'John admires that painting'; and while (33f) escapes over-inclusiveness, it does not show how to construe 'is a proposition' as logically a predicate, especially a quantifiable predicate as needed for (32b).

Of the alternatives (33a-f), (33d) seems to me to be the most satisfactory, indeed not bad at all even with the weakness noted. But while there are ways in which, even with present available resources, I could further refine (33d)'s technical adequacy (see footnote 16 below), does it really matter if it is somewhat flawed as given? *Have I not already defined* 'proposition' *and* 'intentional mode' *simply by* (31) *and its attendant discussion*? It is not an explicit definition, to be sure, but explicit definition is not the only way in which words acquire meaning. Moreover, the task in this case is not to create the "proposition" notion *de novo*, but to discipline and clarify my already-strong intuitions about its proper usage while undertaking thereby no presuppositions which total abstention from this concept could evade. This, I submit, has now been accomplished—quite innocuously—with altogether as much technical exactitude as enjoyed by any other semantical concept of the highest critical repute. In particular, I have an operationally effective procedure for evaluating allegations of propositionhood. Loosely speaking, something is a proposition iff it can be hoped, awared, opined, or otherwise verbed under any verb whose acceptable grammatical objects are restricted to indirectly quoted sentences. To the extent that I believe that someone hopes, awares, or opines an entity x to some degree, to that same extent I also believe that x can be opined and hence that x is a proposition—and since I often introspect that *I* opine thus-and-so, there are quite a number of specific thus-and-sos which I am confident are propositions. Conversely, to the extent I believe that no one opines x to any degree—an opinion which I can justify only by doubting that x *can* be opined [16]—I thereby also believe that x is not a proposition.

Having established my right to speak of propositions, I can safely venture that propositions are in all likelihood well-structured complexes of components which may be called 'concepts'. Without prejudging whether "concepts" should always be viewed as themselves indivisibly atomic, it is convenient to include atomic concepts together with all well-structured concept complexes, fully prepositional or not, in a generic category for which 'construct' is a convenient label. Propositions, concepts, and more generally constructs are of course also

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[16]Could there be unopined propositions? This question has two layers, a soft shell and a hard core. The soft shell is whether for some ϕ and proposition that-*p*, someone ϕs that-*p* even though no one opines that-*p* to any degree. For reasons grounded in technical psychology (*not* ordinary language), I think not. (Even so, with the understanding that a disjunction of verbs accepts only those grammatical objects which are acceptable to each verb in the disjunction, (33d) can be further refined by expanding its verb into a verb phrase like that of (33f).) The hard core is whether there exist propositions which no one ϕs in any mode ϕ. This, I suggest, is a special case of whether there are properties which have no exemplars. And though I am inclined to answer this negatively as well, it is an advanced problem of ontology far too treacherous to presume settled at the very outset of philosophic inquiry. For safety, my present usage of 'proposition' can be taken as short for 'realized proposition', leaving open whether anything exists which has all the properties of a realized propositions other than being intentional-moded by someone.

commonly called 'meanings', which may be precisified as *s*(emantic)-meanings' to distinguish them from other frequently obscure applications of this omnibus term.

My admitting of "concepts" as ingredients from which propositions are compounded is justified on basically the same grounds as admission of propositions themselves, namely, that the commitment inheres in linguistic practices of mine which I can humanly neither abandon outright nor paraphrase away. Making the details of that commitment technically explicit, however, is more troublesome for concepts and their compoundings than it is just for unparsed propositions; and I mistrust how adequately these can be set forth bereft of psychonomic insights yet to be achieved. (Indeed, we still lack clear understanding even of what it is for something to be a compound of components when its part/whole relation is not just set-theoretical membership or inclusion.) For present purposes, it suffices just to anticipate that notions of this sort will eventually solidify as the theory of propositions and their assessment proceeds; if they do not, the framework here readied for their use will simply have no application. Even so, lest this preparation seem unmotivated, I submit that just as a commitment to propositions lies in my acceptance-for-use of sentences, so do my construct commitments show forth in my acceptance of individual words and subpropositional phrases—except that the relevant "words" and "phrases" are not so much what a lexicographer of my idiolect would itemize as the combinatorial units and substructures to which a grammarian would appeal in characterizing the numerically unbounded set of sentences acceptable to me.

Unlike the 'that'-prefix for sentences, ordinary English contains no grammatically basic operator for generating names of subpropositional constructs from linguistic expressions to which these correspond (except insofar as direct quotation, 'the idea of . . .', and other circumlocutions can be pressed into awkward service for this end). To remedy this deficiency, I shall use elevated dots as "semantic" quotes in parallel to the single inverted commas of "syntactic" (better, "lexical") quotation. Thus if '*E*' is a term or more complex linguistic expression, $\cdot E \cdot$ designates the construct, if any, corresponding to the latter. This yields a vocabulary of indirect quotation no longer confined to statements, questions, and commands,[17] thereby permitting inference from ' 'Dummkopf!' exclaimed Hans' to ' 'Idiot!' exclaimed Hans', and allowing me to speculate whether baby Jim says 'daddy' when he says 'dada' (cf. the difference between strong and weak sentence-saying). I do *not* assume, however, that '$\cdot E \cdot$' has a referent whenever '*E*' is an accepted expression in my language, much less a unique referent which is invariant across contexts of usage.

V

Despite my seemingly innocent introduction of 'intentional', above, few readers will be unaware of the panoply of philosophical/psychological issues upon which this term opens. Although I cannot do these full justice here, some further definitions and discussion are nonetheless in order: If *o* ϕs some proposition that-*p*, then by definition *o*'s ϕing-that-*p* is an *intentional (mental) act* whose *mode* (the intending) and *content* (the intended) are ϕ and that-*p*, respectively. (A third, chancier aspect of mental acts often confused with their contents, namely their *objects* or *referents*, will preoccupy this essay's sequel.) The "intention" itself in *o*'s ϕing that-*p* is the attribute, ϕing-that-*p*, which can be common to many specific mental

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[17]As demonstrated by 'John asked, 'is it raining?' ' → 'John asked whether it was raining' and 'John snarled, 'Shut up!' ' → 'John said to shut up', inferences from direct to indirect quotation in English is not completely limited to '*o w*-says '*p*' ' → '*o w*-says that p^*'.

acts and differs from other intentions in its mode, its content, or both.[18]

So far so good, since the anchor-point of "proposition" has been well secured. However, the partial definition of intentional act' proffered so far neither includes nor excludes cases of someone's ϕing c in which c is *not* a proposition. Pregerundized prima facie instances in point are

(34a) John knows/fears/respects/believes/perceives/desires/remembers Mary.

(34b) John is chasing Mary.

(34c) John outweighs Mary.

(34d) John hopes for good weather tomorrow.

(34e) John expects to pass the course.

(34f) John suspects who stole the painting.

(34g) John wonders who stole the painting.

(34h) John is seeking salvation.

Of these, most are by philosophic intuition clearly "intentional" in some sense, one is clearly not, and a couple are problematic. By what criterion of intentionality, broader than the sufficient condition already given, can these intuitions be vouchsafed and the uncertainties resolved? This is, of course, partly a matter of choice: My stipulation, say,

(35) Q is a full intention $=_{\text{def}}$ Q is some ϕing of a proposition (i.e., for some
ϕ and proposition y, $Q = \phi$ing y).

demarks a well-defined class of attributes so long as this construction's implicit ontology of universals can be trusted; and if I judge that some entities which are not full intentions are nonetheless enough *like* full intentions to warrant inclusion with them in a common category, I can choose for this any basis of resemblance I think important—it remains only for me to identify what that basis is to be and persuade others to accept my terminology. An outline of queries and decisions which, when fully implemented, should comfortably settle this matter is as follows: The logjam question is whether the verbs in 'John knows (fears, respects, believes, perceives, desires, remembers) Mary' are strictly the same, respectively, as those in 'John knows (fears, respects, believes, perceives, desires, remembers) that it is raining'. (If so, then some nonpropositional entities—indeed, essentially everything, insomuch as for any noun-phrase 'n' it is possible that someone fears/perceives/contemplates/etc, n—lay claim, as admissible cohorts of intentional modes, to intentional-content status.) If they are, however, then the conjunction of these statements should be equivalent to 'John knows (fears,

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[18]Alternatively, we might call merely the attribute ϕing-that-p, or even just ϕ, the "act" whose intention is that-p. Philosophic usage does not seem to be well-standarized in this regard, and if I may have my usage of 'mode' and 'content', I am willing to let the other terms fall where they may. In the face of stubborn resistance I will even waive 'mode' in favor of 'mood' (cf. Stenius, 1969), though I think it more useful to preserve 'mood' in its specifically linguistic sense denoting certain grammatical constructions associated with intentional modes but differing from them as words differ from concepts.

etc.) Mary and that it is raining', whereas in fact the latter elicits the same feeling of punnish incongruity as does 'She drove off in a flood of tears and a hansom cab' or 'The spectacular short-circuit delighted both the audience and the auditorium'. While this test is not conclusive, it is prima facie evidence for homonymic ambiguity in the verbs in question. On the other hand, some applications of *nearsay*-verbs to phrases not manifestly of 'that-*p*' form are often elliptic for statements of full intention. Thus (34d, e) unpack into

(36d) John hopes that the weather will be good tomorrow.

(36e) John expects that he will pass the course.

Still other *nearsay*-sentences whose grammatical objects do not name propositions paraphrase cleanly as existential generalizations of full-intention statements—e.g., (34f), which is best read as

(36f) $(\exists x)$ (John suspects that x stole the painting).

(Note that the quantification in (36f)—into an "opaque context"—is over concepts. The intuitive acceptability of statements like (34) is an important line of evidence for our commitment to components of propositions.) By paraphrase and distinguishing homonymic verbs, we can thus conclude that few if any intentional modes ("thinking" is perhaps an exception) divide their acceptable contents between propositions and non-propositions. Even so, there are many ways to count a sentence as "full-intentional" in a derivative sense. In addition to (36f), each of the following illustrates a distinctive category of extended full-intentionality:

John believes Mary (i.e., Mary said something which John believes).

John expects Mary (i.e., John expectantly entertains a proposition which is about Mary).

John frightened Mary (i.e., John brought it about that Mary feared something).

That it will rain tonight has a probability of .78 (i.e., intentional content such-and-such has property so-and-so).

Few animals lower than man have the capacity to doubt (i.e., intentional mode such-and-such has property so-and-so).

John can recall his great-grandmother (i.e., John has a property which enables him to remember something about his great-grandmother).

Further, any molecular statement containing one of these is thereby also full-intentional in an even more attenuated sense.

The question still remains, however, whether any ϕings of non-propositional *c*s have enough in common with full intentions to claim equal status with the latter in a joint category. While I sympathize with the inclination to naysay this prospect (e.g. Kneale, 1968), it seems to me that

(37) Q is an intention $=_{\text{def}} Q$ is some ϕing of a construct (i.e., for some ϕ and construct y, $Q = \phi$ing y).

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in which "construct" includes atomic concepts at one extreme and complexes of propositions at the other, not only generalizes (35) in entirely natural fashion but does in fact admit of non-propositional basic intentions, where

(38a) o's-ϕing-c is a basic ϕing-c is an intention, o ϕs c, and there is
      intentional act $=_{\text{def}}$ no intention ψing-c^* such that o ψs c^* while
                                    textitc is a component or substructure of c^* but
                                    not conversely.

(38b) ϕing-c is a basic intention $=_{\text{def}}$ Someone's ϕing-c is a basic intentional act.[19]

Admittedly, few English verbs token the mode of what is obviously a non-propositional intention. But many English sentences of surface form 'o ϕs c' for non-propositional c best analyze as asserting that o ϕ-modes a construct which is *about c* (e.g. 'John loves/perceives/respects Mary', which can plausibly if nonidiomatically be paraphrased as 'John lovingly/perceptually/respectfully entertains a concept of Mary'), while others are ambiguous between 'o ϕ-wise entertains a concept of c' and 'o ϕ-wise entertains the concept $\ulcorner c \urcorner$' (e.g. 'John is looking for a mistress' and 'John is thinking of Pegasus').[20] To be sure, it can be challenged that any of these illustrate *basic* nonpropositional intentions. E.g., it is not introspectively certain that when I perceive or think or remember something, my percept/thought/memory—i.e. the content of my act—can be any less than a full-blooded proposition. But that at least *some* basic intentions are subpropositional is shown beyond all reasonable doubt by 'wondering' and its cognates. Thus when John wonders who stole the painting, it is surely not necessary that John wonders $\ulcorner n$ stole the painting$\urcorner$ (i.e., wonders whether n stole the painting) for any particular noun-phrase n. Rather, (34g) is best explicated as

(36g) John wonders ＿＿＿ stole the painting,

an intention whose content is a propositional schema whose wondering requires no particular completion thereof. Even if intentional acts are usually propositional, therefore, we have no good reason to shun subpropositional basic contents if that gives the most seemly interpretation for some case at hand.[21]

My present characterization of intentionality has made no appeal to traditional criteria for this—freedom from existence commitments and lack of truth-invariance under substitution of identicals or extensional equivalents—because their relevance, I submit, is only marginal. That

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[19] I would prefer to preface this clause by 'It is nomically possible that …'; but since the notion of nomic possibility remains obscure, the definiens in (38b) may instead be taken as short for 'ϕing-c' is a realized basic intention'.

[20] For a similar treatment of 'o knows (it)', see Rozeboom (1972, pp. 75f).

[21] It should be remarked, however, that the content in (36g) is still propositionally *structured* even if that structure is not fully saturated. Whether any basic intentions can take atomic concepts for their contents remains an open question.

The police suspect that the thief has
left town,

The mayor is the thief,	There are no abominable snowmen,
———————————————————-	————————————————————-
The police suspect that the mayor has left town,	Hilary never searched for abominable snowmen,

fail as acceptable deductions despite their prima facie subsumption under the valid argument schemata

$$
\begin{array}{l}
Px \\
x = y \\
\hline
Py
\end{array}
\qquad\qquad
\begin{array}{l}
\sim (\exists x)\,Px \\
\hline
\sim (\exists x)\,Px \cdot Qx
\end{array}
$$

has nothing more to do with the special character of intentionality than does the failure of

John bought his car on time,	Had the Kennedys not been assassinated, the 37th U.S. President would have been a Democrat,
Jim paid cash for his car,	Nixon is the 37th U.S. President,
———————————————————	——————————————————-
Someone's car was bought on time by John and paid cash for by Jim.	Had the Kennedys not been assassinated, Nixon would have been a Democrat.

Both pairs of cases illustrate merely the fallacies which arise when an expression's context-dependency fails to secure constancy of reference within an argument's scope. One need not accept Frege's thesis, that expressions in oblique contexts refer to their direct-context meanings, to grant that *nearsay*-verbs give their grammatical objects a different linguistic role than they generally have elsewhere. Intentionality's traditional criteria may help to discern in problematic cases whether the phrase at issue lies within the scope of an indirect-quotation operator, but expressions produced by that operator are no less liege to principles of reference and identity than are expressions unblessed by this transformation. Thus if ˙left town˙ = ˙exurbed himself˙, it follows that the police suspect ˙the thief has left town˙ iff they suspect ˙the thief has exurbed himself˙; while Hilary could not have searched-for ˙abominable snowmen˙ had there been no ˙abominable snowmen˙ concept to guide his search—nor for that matter can I correctly assert that Hilary so searched unless my own ˙abominable snowmen˙ concept is essentially the same as his, regardless of what verbal vehicle (e.g. 'Yeti') he may have used to express it.

To be sure, the notion of identity between constructs—"synonymy"—has been aspersed in some quarters of late as philosophically a broken reed. Indeed, perhaps the strongest rea-

son advanced for looking askance at a philosophy of language grounded upon "meanings" is that we have no good identity criterion for propositions and concepts. I agree that this is a problem, but one which less impugns the ontic status of semantic meanings than it reflects insufficiencies in our technical conception of Identity. In the first place, when we claim that $a = b$, we usually mean not that a and b are strictly identical in the toughest possible sense, but only that a and b are sufficiently similar in relevant respects. This point is most evident regarding universals (is or is not this color, shape, texture, etc. the same as that one?)[22] But it holds for physical objects as well—not just for a continuant's different temporal stages ("genidentity") but even for synchronous objects. (Our concepts of persons, places, and things seldom specify their spatial boundaries with perfect clarity, and there is no good reason to suppose that the gradations of those boundaries ever perfectly align for two distinct names.) Our "identity" concept can well stand liberalization to admit of degrees. Moreover, if I am correct in suspecting that identity-statement '$a = b$' is best analyzed as the semantical claim that 'a' and 'b' (or better, ˙a˙ and ˙b˙) are co-referential, any threat to classical semantics simplistic view of reference (e.g. Rozeboom, 1971) also jeopardizes philosophic conclusions grounded on correspondingly simplistic construals of Sameness and Identity. How to decide when two s-meanings are synonymous is simply not a foundational issue of semantics. (Even so, see Rozeboom, 1972, 72f..)

VI

To summarize this preface to metasemantics, let me try to make clear why I have endeavored so fulsomely to legitimize talk of s-meanings when for most readers I could have this ancient presumption simply for the asking. What is noteworthy about my argument is not the originality of its conclusion, but how little it needed to presuppose. I relaxed its austerity after attaining the 'proposition' concept, but until then it dealt exclusively in the hardest coin of my linguistic economy, submitting only that I can neither abstain from the use of expressions of a certain kind —specifically, indirect quotation and associated verbs—nor regard these as derivative from the corresponding direct quotations with which language theory is prima facie most directly concerned. And I managed to introduce 'proposition' and 'intention' as predicates truthfully affixable just to certain nominal clauses of this basic kind *without* presuming anything about the semantics or ontology of these nominalizations. In particular, nothing was assumed about the nature of propositions and intentional acts, nor about their relations to other entities—what has been said so far is compatible with their being *anything*, even equivalence-classes of sentences. It has not even been necessary to conclude that propositions and intentional acts exist, or that when I use indirect discourse I am talking about anything. (I am, to be sure, clearly committed to these latter conclusions, but my not having needed to draw them explicitly shows how philosophically chaste I have so far remained.)

Despite my insistence on the irreducibility of propositions to sentences, I could easily develop semantics as a theory of sentences, rather than of propositions were the primacy order to come out the other way. Why then my insistence? Because, dammit, that's the way it is. One important result of its being that way is that the semantic commitment of my linguistic economy can be analyzed much more naturally, and hence with much stronger intuitional insights and safeguards, in terms of indirect quotings than in terms of sentence-sayings; and

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[22]To be sure, the problem of identity for universals (or conversely, in recent jargon, their individuation) is a well-known argument against platonic ontologies. However, it is not the identity criterion as such which is here bothersome—Leibnitz's principle works as well for universals as it does for particulars—but obscurity in what, beyond which particulars exemplify them, are the attributes by virtue of which one universal differs from another.

it would be not merely perverse but foolhardy—like seeking lightness-of-foot on the mountain face by discarding one's crampons—to cast aside this epistemic protection. Yet two of our most important modern philosophers of language, Sellars and Quine, have held just the opposite. Quine's unrelenting aversion to meanings is well known while Sellars has recently summarized his position as

> ... in my view the fundamental concept pertaining to thinking is thinking-out-loud as conceived by our logical behaviorists .... I accept mental acts in something like the classical sense (as nondispositional inner episodes), but argue that the concept of such acts is ... a derivative concept .... Thus at the primary level, instead of analyzing the intentionality or aboutness of verbal behavior in terms of its expressing or being used to express classically conceived thoughts or beliefs, we'should recognize that this verbal behavior *is already thinking in its own right*, and its intentionality or aboutness is simply the appropriateness of classifying it in terms which relate to the linguistic behavior of the group to which one belongs. (Sellars, 1969, p. 527)

And these are but headlands along a coast of modern philosophic outlooks from which it might appear that classic mentalism has foundered in the wake of Ryle and the later Wittgenstein.

Yet even as (some) philosophers have turned to home-grown behavioral reconstructions of mental concepts, technical psychology has within recent years abandoned its own radical behavioristic preoccupations of the preceding half-century for a massive return to study of inner events—in whose description, moreover, classic mentalistic notions again figure with increasingly unabashed prominence. It does not, of course, follow that philosophers of language must continue to respect classically conceived mental entities just because psychonomic science is once again attempting to do so. But it would seem a bit presumptuous of them to feel confident that their own behavioral models, which are several orders of magnitude more primitive than recent work in advanced behavioristics that still fails to explain behavioral phenomena of the more "cognitive" sort, provide much insight into the psychology of language.

Or is psychonomic science really all that relevant to the philosophy of language? It is indeed, even with its present meager knowledge about the details of inner mechanisms. For honest[23] behavioristic analysis of well-established phenomena even at the infrahuman level gives considerable support to the conclusion that internal processes something *like* those envisioned by classic mentalistic theories often mediate between stimulation and overt responding. The most solid point of this support is also the most obvious: A system of shapes or

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[23]By this I mean to exclude especially, though not exclusively, the latter-day radical behaviorism of B. F. Skinner, which substitutes promissory polemics for genuine prediction and control in environments more variable than those standard to operant conditioning research. (Cf. Rozeboom, 1974, footnote 2.) In general, regarding latent learning, transposition, and other behavior-theoretic paradigms for experimental diagnosis of internal mechanisms more complex than single-stage S-R associations, Skinnerian behavioristics implies, without ever having examined the issues, either nothing at all or—depending on how certain crucial ambiguities in its technical concepts are interpreted—"stupid" behavior which in fact is not at all typical of humans and probably other higher mammals. I regret sounding so one-sidedly negative in my appraisal of the Skinnerian tradition, since this has in fact made extremely valuable contributions to the scientific study of behavior. But whereas this is the only style of behavioral psychology to which most philosophers of language seem to have had any appreciable exposure, it is important to emphasize both that Skinner's latter-day proclamations of its prowess grotesquely outreach its actual development, and that elsewhere in the behavior-theoretic literature can be found considerably more penetrating analyses of the inner workings of organisms—see, e.g., the developments reviewed in Rozeboom, 1970, pp. 103–156.

sounds comprises a language only through being a language *for* someone—which in turn obtains only when what transpires during that person's reception and production of those stimuli is of an appropriate sort. Precisely what that "appropriate sort" may be is still profoundly unknown.[24] But it follows regardless that whatever semantical properties may be possessed by linguistic stimuli derive from the psychological attributes, episodic or dispositional, of persons to whom those stimuli are linguistic, *so that the semantics of overt words and their compounds is derivative from a more fundamental semantics of certain conditions inside*[25] *the language, user*. Language behavior aside, moreover, to explain the empirically detectable patterns by which behavior acquired in one environment generalizes to new stimulus totalities we must acknowledge internal states of the organism which not only correspond elementwise to select features of its environment but which also, at least at times, function as components of integrated complexes having a proposition-like structure (cf. Rozeboom, 1974, p. 235). If external stimulation generally elicits propositionally-structured internal processes in humans, why should not some of these be what commonsense mentalistic psychology conceives through use of indirect quotation, i.e., as "meanings"? And whereas much of learning comprises central processes becoming evocatively responsive to afferent or other internal events not originally effective at this, why should not language learning consist of certain external stimuli coming to arouse—i.e. to call forth or "ex-press"—in a suitably special way meaning-complexes alternatively evocable by nonlinguistic stimuli?

For psychologists of language, in short, there is in principle nothing at all mystical about semantic meaning. Words work the way they do only because they have certain complex internal effects upon their users, effects which we have reason to think are not all that different from central processes whose instigators are nonlinguistic. With or without the approval of philosophers, psychonomic science is going to become increasingly knowledgeable about these inner mechanisms, including a deepened understanding of what transpires when people function in ways commonsensically described in the vernacular of intentional modes and contents. Regardless of whether technical psychology elects to adopt this lay terminology, purified and expanded as necessary, or instead favors "hypothetical constructs" whose theoretic definitions stress behavioral indices without regard for these predicates' introspective applicability, it is scarcely credible that classic mentalistic psychology will not prove to be a limited, idealized, imperfect account of behavior-mediating events that seem no more occult to natural science a generation or two hence than do the observationally remote inner workings of complex inorganic systems to natural science today.

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[24]With virtually no significant exceptions, neither psychologists nor philosophers have appreciated the theoretical difficulty in distinguishing stimuli which are "linguistic" from those which are not. I have argued elsewhere (Rozeboom, 1972, pp. 44–46) that doing so 'requires a relatively sophisticated account of how an intention's mode is nomically determined'. If so, any theory of language which professes to eschew mentalistic modes and contents simply begs the question if it takes the language/non-language distinction as an unexamined given, and fails altogether as an account of language if what it says about linguistic behavior applies equally well to an organism's transactions with stimuli of all kinds. The force of this point may be illustrated by turning it upon Sellars' position quoted above: If verbal behavior is already "thinking in its own right", what human behaviors are *not* verbal (surely the distinction is not merely *vocal*/*nonvocal*); what nonverbal human behaviors, if any, are also "thinking in their own right"; and what behaviors of monkeys, dogs, fish, and planaria are either (*a*) verbal or (*b*) thinking in their own right?

[25]"Inside" in the sense of features of events which causally mediate between peripheral input and output. Even when the property at issue is predicated of the person as a whole, as when we say that John is courageous, or fatigued, or hoping for rain, it is no more inappropriate to think of this as "inside," its bearer than it is to think of a crystal's microstructure as "inside" the crystal of which that structure is predicated. Once it is granted that a thing's attributes are not inside it in the same way that its interior parts are inside, there is no reason why we should not speak so to demark attributes which depend upon the condition of their bearer's interior parts.

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